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Abstract
We consider the problem of portfolio optimization with a correlation constraint. The frame-
work is the multiperiod stochastic financial market setting with one tradable stock, stochastic
income and a non-tradable index. The correlation constraint is imposed on the portfolio and
the non-tradable index at some benchmark time horizon. The goal is to maximize portofolio’s
expected exponential utility subject to the correlation constraint. Two types of optimal portfolio
strategies are considered: the subgame perfect and the precommitment ones. We find analytical
expressions for the constrained subgame perfect (CSGP) and the constrained precommitment
(CPC) portfolio strategies. Both these portfolio strategies yield significantly lower risk when
compared to the unconstrained setting, at the cost of a small utility loss. The performance of
the CSGP and CPC portfolio strategies is similar.
Keywords: portfolio optimization, correlation constraints
JEL Classification Numbers: 91B06, 60H30
1 Introduction
Mean variance optimization introduced by Markowitz Markowitz (1952) changed the pathway
of how fund managers look at optimal investments. However, mean variance analysis is a special
case of more general expected utility framework introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). Our goal is to maximize expected exponential utility function
subject to a correlation constraint. Portfolio optimization under correlation constraints is of par-
ticular interest to hedge funds which implement market defensive strategies with higher returns
during down markets than up-markets, and this makes our research interesting from a practical
standpoint.
Although portfolio allocation within expected utility paradigm is very well explored prob-
lem in finance, few studies have considered portfolio allocation with correlation constraint. Re-
cent works that stand out and are also the motivation of this study are Bernard and Vanduffel
(2014),Pourbabaee et al. (2016) and Bernard et al. (2018). In Bernard and Vanduffel (2014), the
authors addressed the problem of mean variance optimization along with correlations constraint.
∗Email: aditya.maheshwari0210@gmail.com. The views expressed in this article are the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Bank of America Securities.
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The work Pourbabaee et al. (2016) looks at the problem of capital allocation with correlation con-
straint, and the objective is minimizing capital at risk. The paper Bernard et al. (2018) extended
Bernard and Vanduffel (2014), and Pourbabaee et al. (2016) to law invariant preferences. All these
works consider a static framework; the optimization is performed at time zero and the optimal
strategies are implemented. However, if at a later time the optimization criterion and the risk
constraint are dynamically updated the time zero strategy fails to remain optimal due to the corre-
lation constraint; this is refer to as time inconsistency. In the presence of a commitment mechanism
the time zero optimal strategy also known as the precommitment strategy, will be implemented.
Otherwise, there will be an incentive to deviate from the precommitment strategy and one way out
of this predicament is to consider the subgame perfect strategy, also known as the Nash equilibrium
strategy.
This paper considers the expected exponential utility maximization with correlation constraint
in a discrete time setting. The multi-period stochastic financial market comprises one tradable
stock, stochastic income and a non-tradable index. The non-linearity of correlation constraint turn
the optimization problem time inconsistent as explained above. The constrained subgame perfect
strategy (CSGP) is naturally defined in our context through backward induction. The constrained
precommitment strategy (CPC) is considered as well. We compare the performance of these two
portfolio strategies against the unconstrained subgame perfect strategy (UnSGP).
Contribution: Our first and foremost contribution is the analytic solutions for the CSGP and
CPC strategies. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of other studies which consider time
inconsistency arising due to the correlation constraint in the context of portfolio optimization in a
multi-period setting. Secondly, through numerical simulations we provide evidence for significant
risk reduction in “high risk” environment by following CSGP and CPC strategies compared to
the UnSGP strategy. To illustrate an example, the increase in uncertainty due to increasing the
investment horizon from 2 period to 10 period results in 50% improvement in utility at the expense
of 150% increase in risk for the UnSGP strategy. In contrast, our CSGP strategy results in 30%
improvement in utility together with 18% reduction in risk. Thirdly, we find the CSGP and CPC
strategy to perform approximately the same for our portfolio allocation problem. This in contrast
to the results in Wu (2013) where authors find the CPC strategy to significantly outperform the
CSGP strategy in the context of mean-variance optimization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows - Section 2 describes the model; the stock price
process, benchmark index and stochastic income stream, the trading strategies, risk preference,
and the objective. Section 3 gives our first result for single period problem. Section 4 provides
the result for the multi-period setting. In Section 5, we present numerical examples. The paper
concludes in Section 6. The proofs of the results are presented in the Appendix.
2 Model
In this paper, we consider a multi-period stochastic model of investment. The randomness is
associated with three discrete time random walks sn, 
I
n and 
b
n defined on a complete probability
space (Ω,F tN , {Ftn} ,P). The random walks are symmetric in P and
P(jn = ±1) = 1/2, n = 0, 1, . . . , N, j = s, I, b. (2.1)
There are two securities available for trading, the stock and the bond. We take bond as numeraire
and thus assume it offers zero interest rate. There is a stream of income for the agent and a
benchmark index representing the state of the economy.
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The trading horizon is [0, T ], which we divide into N trading dates t = 0, h, ..., (N − 1)h. Here
h = T/N , and tn = nh for n = 0, 1, 2, ..., N . The stock price process S := {St : t = 0, h, ..., (N−1)h}
follows the difference equation
∆Stn = Stn(µ1h+ σ1
√
hsn), (2.2)
where S0 > 0 and ∆Stn = Stn+1 − Stn . Drift parameter µ1 and volatility parameter σ1 are chosen
so that the stock price remains positive. The agent in this economy also receives random income
at every time point. Income process I := {It : t = 0, h, ..., (N − 1)h} of the agent is given by
∆Itn = e
ktn |µ2h+ σ2
√
hIn|. (2.3)
The benchmark index B := {Bt : t = 0, h, ..., (N−1)h}, represents the performance of the economy
and is correlated to the underlying stock and the income. It is given by the following difference
equation:
∆Btn = Btn(µ3h+ σ3
√
h(a31
s
n + a32
I
n + a33
b
n)) (2.4)
where a31 > 0, a32 > 0 and a33 =
√
1− a231 − a232. As previously, drift µ3 and volatility σ3 are
chosen so that the benchmark index is positive.
2.1 Trading Strategies
An investor in this model starts with initial wealth X0 = x ∈ R for investment in stocks. Let
pin be the amount of wealth invested in stock at time tn : n = 0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1. The wealth from
investments is governed by the self-financing equation
∆Xtn = pin(µ1h+ σ1
√
hsn) (2.5)
2.2 Risk Preference
The utility of the agent is assumed to be of exponential type with coefficient of absolute risk
aversion given by γ. Specifically,
U(x) = − exp(−γx) (2.6)
2.3 Objective Function
The performance of the strategy pi is measured by the expected utility criterion applied to final
wealth subject to a correlation constraint. Assume the current time is tn.The final wealth WtN is
given by sum of wealth accumulated due to investment and random income. Thus, WtN = XtN+ItN .
maximize
pi∈Πtn
EP[−e−γWpitN |Ftn ]
subject to correl(WtN , BtN |Ftn) ≤ −δ
(2.7)
where Πtn denotes the set of admissible trading strategies defined by
Πtn :=
{
pitn , pitn+1 , ..., pitN−1 : pitk ∈ Ftk
}
, (2.8)
and the constraint in (2.7) is satisfied. In most of works the performance of a strategy is measured
at tn = t0 = 0.
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2.4 Time inconsistency
Non-linearity of the correlation constraint makes the optimization problem (2.7) time inconsis-
tent. More precisely, the investor may have incentive to deviate from the optimal strategy they
computed at past times. Thus, if at time t0 optimal strategy is give by
pˆi = arg
maximizepi∈Πt0 E
P[−e−γWpitN ]
subject to correl(WtN , BtN ) ≤ −δ
 (2.9)
then the optimal strategy evaluated at future time tn may not be the same. Thus, for times between
[tn,tN ]
pˆi 6= arg
maximizepi∈Πtn E
P[−e−γWpitN |Ftn ]
subject to correl(WtN , BtN |Ftn) ≤ −δ
 (2.10)
2.5 Subgame Perfect Strategy
This paper follows Kwak et al. (2013) and Pirvu and Zhang (2013) in introducing the subgame
perfect portfolio strategies as a substitute for optimal investment strategy. Let us proceed with a
formal definition.
Definition 2.1 Let us assume that total time tN=T is divided into h small time steps. So, total
number of time steps is N = T/h. First, let us consider the time period [(N-1)h,Nh]. At time
(N-1)h the optimization problem is:
maximize
pitN−1
E[−e−γ(XpitN+ItN )|FtN−1 ]
subject to correl(WtN , BtN |FtN−1) ≤ −δ
(P1)
On time period [(N-2)h,Nh], the trading strategies pi are considered to be of the form
pi =
{
pi∗tN−1 on [(N − 1)h,Nh)
pitN−2 on [(N − 2)h, (N − 1)h)
for FtN−2 measurable pitN−2 such that (pitN−2 , pi
∗
tN−2) ∈ ΠtN−2. The optimization problem is
maximize
pitN−2
E[−e−γ(XpitN+ItN )|FtN−2 ]
subject to correl(WtN , BtN |FtN−2) ≤ −δ
(P2)
Now, we can proceed iteratively. For the period [(N-n)h,Nh], the trading strategies pi considered are
of the form
pi =
{
pi∗tk when k = N − n+ 1, N − n+ 2, ..., N − 1
pitk when k = N − n
for FtN−n measurable pitN−n such that (pitN−n ,
{
pi∗tk
}
k=N−n+1,N−n+2,...,N−1) ∈ ΠtN−n. The opti-
mization problem is
maximize
pitN−n
E[−e−γ(XpitN+ItN )|FtN−n ]
subject to correl(WtN , BtN |FtN−n) ≤ −δ
(Pn)
4
Thus, the subgame perfect strategy is pi∗ = (pi∗t0 , pi
∗
t1 , pi
∗
t2 , ...., pi
∗
tN−1).
With the portfolio optimization problems in place, we are ready to state our first result.
3 Single Period Optimization
Standing Assumption Within this section we assume that δ ∈ (0, a31) because whenever
δ > a31 there are no admissible trading strategies. The following lemma gives the correlation for
the single period optimization problem. Let
M =
eTk
2
(|µ2h+ σ2
√
h|+ |µ2h− σ2
√
h|) (3.1)
Lemma 3.1 The correlation between total wealth WtN and the index BtN conditional on FtN−1 is
given by
correl(WtN , BtN |FtN−1) =
pitN−1σ1a31
√
h+Ma32√
pi2tN−1σ
2
1h+M
2
(3.2)
Proof. See Appendix A
Now, we are in right spot to state the first theorem on optimal investment for single period
model. First we state the result for the unconstrained case.
Theorem 3.1 The subgame perfect strategy p¯i of the unconstrained portfolio optimization problem
is given by
p¯i = arg max
pitN−1
E[−e−γ(XpitN+ItN )|FtN−1 ] =
1
2γσ1
√
h
ln(
1 + θ
√
h
1− θ√h). (3.3)
Proof. See Appendix B
Let
R1 :=
M
σ1
√
h(a231 − δ2)
(−a31a32 − δ
√
a231 + a
2
32 − δ2), θ =
µ1
σ1
. (3.4)
Let us move to the constrained case.
Theorem 3.2 The subgame perfect strategy pi∗tN−1 of the portfolio optimization problem P1 is given
by
pi∗tN−1 = min {p¯i, R1} . (3.5)
Proof. See Appendix C
Remark 3.1 Due to the assumption of exponential utility, the optimal strategy pi∗tN−n is indepen-
dent of the wealth at time tN−n. Furthermore, if the constraint is binding, the optimal strategy is
also independent of the risk aversion parameter γ.
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4 Multi Period Optimization
In this subsection, we will look at the multiperiod optimization problem Pn. Since the subgame
perfect strategy is achieved using backward induction, imagine that we know the portfolio strategy
for every time after tN−n and we want to find the optimal strategy at tN−n. Let
θ3 =
σ3
√
h
µ˜3
, µ˜3 = 1 + hµ3, b1 = θ3σ1a31
√
h,
k21,n = [(1 + θ
2
3)
n − 1]σ21h for n = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N
Standing Assumption Within this section we will assume that δ ∈ (0, b1k1,N ) since whenever
δ > b1k1,N there are no admissible trading strategies. Before moving further, we will first compute
the correlation between the final wealth and index given information till time tN−n.
Let
b1 := θ3σ1a31
√
h (4.1)
k21,n := [(1 + θ
2
3)
n − 1]σ21h (4.2)
M := |µ2h+ σ2
√
h| − |µ2h− σ2
√
h|
2
(4.3)
b2,N−n(pi) := θ3[Ma32
N∑
s=N−n+1
ekts + σ1a31
√
h
N−1∑
i=N−n+1
pii] (4.4)
k22,N−n(pi) := [(1 + θ
2
3)
n − 1]{M2
N∑
s=N−n+1
e2kts + σ21h
N−1∑
i=N−n+1
pi2ti} (4.5)
Lemma 4.1 The correlation between total wealth WtN and the index BtN conditional on FtN−n is
given by
correl(XN + IN , BN |FtN−n) =
b1pitN−n + b2,N−n√
k21,npi
2
tN−n + k
2
2,N−n
. (4.6)
Proof. Details in Appendix D
Next we present the central result of the paper, i.e., the subgame perfect strategy for multi-
period model.
Theorem 4.1 The subgame perfect strategy of the portfolio optimization problems P1, P2,...Pn
for n=1,2,...N is
pi∗tN−n = min {p¯i, R1,N−n} , (4.7)
where R1,N−n is the left root of the quadratic equation
Q(x) = x2(b21 − k21,nδ2) + 2b1b2,N−n(pi∗)x+ ([b2,N−n(pi∗)]2 − δ2[k2,N−n(pi∗)]2) = 0 (4.8)
Moreover, b1, b2,N−n, k2,N−n, k1,n and θ3 are defined above.
Proof. Details in Appendix E
6
4.1 Pre-commitment Strategy
The subgame pefect strategy of Theorem 4.1 led to constant pi∗tN−n for ∀n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. This
leads us to search for a time t = t0 = 0 deterministic optimal strategy, we call precommitment
strategy, formally defined below
Definition 4.1 The time zero deterministic optimal strategy is called the precommitment strategy
and it is denoted by Πˆ. Thus, it is the solution of
maximize
pit0 ,pit1 ,...pitN−1 deterministic
E[−e−γ(XpitN+ItN )]
subject to correl(WtN , BtN ) ≤ −δ.
(4.9)
As in Theorem 4.1 let
k1 := k1,N , b2 := b2,0(pi), k2 := k2,0, a := 1− δ
2k21
b21
.
For deterministic pit0 , pit1 , ...pitN−1 , we can reformulate the problem the above optimization problem
as,
maximize
pit0 ,pit1 ,...pitN−1
E[−e−γ(
∑N−1
i=0 pii(µ1h+σ1
√
hsi ))]
subject to
b1
∑N−1
i=0 pii + b2√
k21
∑N−1
i=0 pi
2
i + k
2
2
≤ −δ.
(4.10)
Let
c =
b2
b1
, h2 =
k22δ
2
b21
and b =
−c
a+N − 1 (4.11)
Finally we state our next theorem on the deterministic precommittement strategy.
Theorem 4.2 The deterministic precommittement strategy is given by
pˆiti = min{p¯i,−b−
√
c2(1− a)
N(a+N − 1)2 +
h2
N(a+N − 1)} , i ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}. (4.12)
Proof. Appendix F
Our last result concerns the optimal unconstrained strategies and is summarized by the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.3 In the unconstrained case, the subgame perfect strategy and the precommittement
strategy are equal, and they are given by
pˆiti = pi
∗
ti = p¯i =
1
2γσ1
√
h
ln(
1 + θ
√
h
1− θ√h), i ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}. (4.13)
Proof. Appendix G
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5 Numerical Simulation
In this section we use numerical simulations to compare the performance of three strategies, (i)
CSGP (ii) CPC, and (iii) UnSGP under different scenarios. The base parameters for the experiment
are given in Table 1. Return of the strategy is measured via the expected terminal utility and the
corresponding risk via 5th percentile of the terminal wealth, defined for ith strategy as:
P 0.05i = perctile
(
W iT , 5%
)
, i ∈ {UnSGP,CSGP,CPC},
Intuitively, P 0.05i < X0 + I0 implies that the strategy lost money and P
0.05
i > X0 + I0 reflects the
profit at even the 5th percentile.
µ1 = 7%, µ2 = 3%, µ3 = 5%, σ1 = 30%, σ2 = 10%, σ3 = 25%
a31 = a32 = 0.6, γ = 0.5, k = 0, δ = 9%
N = 8, X0 = I0 = B0 = 1, h = 1, Nsim = 10 (millions)
Table 1: Parameters for the simulations.
Portfolio Investment: Figure 1 depicts the portfolio investment of the CSGP and the CPC
strategy. These graphs present several interesting features of the two strategies. First, the negative
correlation constraint results in short position in stock for CSGP and CPC strategy, this is in
contrast to the long position for the UnSGP strategy. Secondly, the investments in CSGP strategy
depends only on the number of time steps remaining. As a result, the investment remains the same
in the last time step regardless of whether N = 2, 4, 6, 8 or 10. On the contrary, the optimal
investment in CPC strategy depends on the length of the investment horizon. Thirdly, for CSGP
strategy the absolute value of the short position at time t = 0 is lower for short investment horizon,
i.e. |pit0 | for N = 2 is smaller than |pit0 | for N = 10. This is because the shorter time horizon
allows the investor to better control the correlation constraint at the terminal step. Finally, the
investments in the CPC strategy is approximately the time average of the investments for the
CSGP strategy. This relationship results in the corresponding expected terminal utility of the two
strategies to be almost the same. On the contrary, Wu (2013) report higher utility for the CPC
strategy. In our problem, the choice of exponential utility function makes the optimal investment
strategies to be independent of the initial wealth which in-turn leads to similar performance of CPC
and CSGP strategy. Consequently, for the remaining simulations we present results for only CSGP
and UnSGP strategy.
Impact of correlation constraint: Figure 2 depicts the impact of correlation constraint at
the terminal expected utility (and risk) for the CSGP strategy relative to the terminal expected
utility (and risk) at δ = 1%. We find that a more conservative constraint (higher δ) leads to lower
utility and higher risk for different values of N . While lower utility for higher δ is expected, higher
risk is driven by increased short position in stocks. For N = 2, we find the utility declines by 2%
and risk increases by 8% as we increase from δ = 1% to δ = 40%. Longer investment horizon leads
to higher reduction in utility and increase in risk due to increased uncertainty in stock price.
Performance in risky environment Next, we discuss the advantage of CSGP relative to
UnSGP strategy as the investment scenario becomes more risky. We consider two risk scenarios:
(i) Longer investment horizon (cf. Figure 2) and (ii) Higher correlation of terminal wealth for
unconstrained portfolio with the market index.
• Longer investment horizon: Figure 3 depicts the impact of investment horizon on the
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Figure 1: Optimal portfolio investment
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Figure 2: Impact of δ on the CSGP strategy.
expected terminal utility and risk due to CSGP and UnSGP strategy. The UnSGP strategy
leads to 50% increase in utility and 150% increase in risk of the portfolio as we increase
investment horizon N from 2 to 10. On the contrary, the CSGP strategy leads to only 30%
increase in utility but the risk reduces by 18%. Thus for the long investment horizon CSGP
strategy not only improves utility but also provides considerable risk reduction.
• Higher correlation of unconstrained portfolio wealth with market index: Figure 4
considers the impact of ρWpiT ,BT
on utility and risk. We consider different scenarios of ρWpiT ,BT
by changing the volatility of the stock σ1 and the index σ3. For simplicity we consider
scenarios such that σ := σ1 = σ3. As ρWpiT ,BT
increases, the UnSGP strategy provides 55%
improvement in utility, however, it results in 250% increase in risk relative to low correlation
environment. For such high risk environment, the CSGP strategy provides considerable risk
reduction. Unlike UnSGP strategy, here we observe 6% reduction in risk at the expense of
5% loss of utility.
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Figure 3: Impact of investment horizon (N)
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Figure 4: High correlation environment
6 Concluding remarks
We study the impact of correlation constraint on a portfolio optimization problem of one stock
and stochastic income stream in a discrete multiperiod setting. The constraint represents the corre-
lation of the wealth of the portfolio with a benchmark index representing the state of the economy.
The non-linearity due to correlation constraint results in time inconsistency of the optimal portfo-
lios. A solution to this time consistency issue is the subgame perfect (CSGP) strategy introduced
through backward induction. This strategy considers the portfolio problem as a non-cooperative
game between players at each time point. We compare the performance of CSGP strategy to the
constrained precommitment (CPC) and the unconstrained subgame perfect (UnSGP) strategy. Us-
ing numerical simulations we find that the correlation constraint provides significant risk reduction
relative to the unconstrained strategy. The reduction in risk compensates for the loss in utility
due to the constraint. We also find similar performances of the two constrained strategies CSGP
and CPC. Future works aim at extending the model to allow for more than one stock as well as
convergence results to a continuous time model.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.1
For defining correlation we need some fundamental quantities like covariance between WtN , BtN
and variance of WtN and BtN . Recall that tN = T.
Cov(WtN , BtN |FtN−1) = Cov(ItN , BtN |FtN−1) + Cov(XtN , BtN |FtN−1) (A.1)
= pitN−1BtN−1σ1σ3a31h+ e
TkBtN−1σ3a32
√
h{|µ2h+ σ2
√
h| − |µ2h− σ2
√
h|
2
}
(A.2)
V ar(WtN |FtN−1) = V (XtN |FtN−1) + V (ItN |FtN−1) (A.3)
= pi2tN−1σ
2
1h+
e2Nk
4
(|µ2h+ σ2
√
h|+ |µ2h− σ2
√
h|)2 (A.4)
V ar(BtN |FtN−1) = B2tN−1σ23h (A.5)
Thus, correlation between WtN and BtN conditional on FtN−1 is given by
correl(WtN , BtN |FtN−1) =
pitN−1σ1a31
√
h+Ma32√
pi2tN−1σ
2
1h+M
2
(A.6)
where, as before, M = e
Tk
2 (|µ2h+ σ2
√
h|+ |µ2h− σ2
√
h|).
B Proof of Theorem 3.1
In this section, we will derive the optimal investment for the unconstrained problem.
p¯i = p¯itN−1 = arg maxE[−e−γ(XtN+ItN )|FtN−n ] (B.1)
= arg min e−γ(XtN−1+ItN−1 )E[e−γ(XtN−XtN−1+ItN−ItN−1 )|FtN−n ] (B.2)
= arg min e−γ(XtN−1+ItN−1 )E[e−γpitN−1 (µ1h+σ1
√
hsN )|FtN−n ]E[e−γe
ktN |µ2h+σ2
√
hIN ||FtN−n ]
(B.3)
= arg min e−γ(XtN−1+ItN−1 ){e
−γpitN−1 (µ1h+σ1
√
h) + e−γpitN−1 (µ1h−σ1
√
h)
2
}C (B.4)
= arg min{e−γpitN−1 (µ1h+σ1
√
h) + e−γpitN−1 (µ1h−σ1
√
h)} (B.5)
=
1
2γσ1
√
h
ln(
1 + θ
√
h
1− θ√h), (B.6)
where
θ =
µ1
σ1
, C = {e
−γektN |µ2h+σ2
√
h| + e−γektN |µ2h−σ2
√
h|
2
}.
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C Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. By Lemma 3.1 it follows that
correl(WtN , BtN |FtN−1) =
pitN−1σ1
√
ha31 +Ma32√
pi2tN−1σ
2
1h+M
2
.
Thus
correl(WtN , BtN |FtN−1) =
pitN−1σ1
√
ha31 +Ma32√
pi2tN−1σ
2
1h+M
2
≤ −δ (C.1)
⇔ (pitN−1σ1
√
ha31 +Ma32√
pi2tN−1σ
2
1h+M
2
)2 ≥ δ2 and pitN−1σ1
√
ha31 +Ma32 ≤ 0
(C.2)
⇔ pi2tN−1σ21h(a231 − δ2) + 2pitN−1σ1
√
ha31a32M +M
2(a232 − δ2) ≥ (C.3)
and pitN−1 ≤
−Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
(C.4)
By (C.3) we get that
pitN−1 ≤ R1 and pitN−1 ≥ R2 (C.5)
where
R1 =
M
σ1
√
h(a231 − δ2)
(−a31a32 − δ
√
a231 + a
2
32 − δ2) (C.6)
R2 =
M
σ1
√
h(a231 − δ2)
(−a31a32 + δ
√
a231 + a
2
32 − δ2) (C.7)
Also, (C.4) tells us that
pitN−1 ≤
−Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
.
To complete the proof it remains to show that
R1 <
−Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
< R2. (C.8)
Since,
−Ma32
σ1
√
h(a31 − δ2a31 )
<
−Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
(C.9)
=⇒ −Ma32
σ1
√
h(a31 − δ2a31 )
− Mδ
√
a231 + a
2
32 − δ2
σ1
√
h(a231 − δ2)
<
−Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
(C.10)
=⇒ R1 < −Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
. (C.11)
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For the claim −Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
< R2, we take a slightly different route. Notice that
R2 =
M
σ1
√
h(a231 − δ2)
(−a31a32 + δ
√
a231 + a
2
32 − δ2) (C.12)
=
−Ma31a32
σ1
√
h(a231 − δ2)
+
M
σ1
√
h(a231 − δ2)
δ
√
a231 + a
2
32 − δ2) (C.13)
=
−Ma32
σ1
√
ha31(1− δ2a231 )
+
Ma32
σ1
√
ha31(1− δ2a231 )
δ
√
1
a231
+
1
a232
− δ
2
a231a
2
32
(C.14)
=
−Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
(
1
1− δ2
a231
)[1− δ
√
1
a231
+
1
a232
− δ
2
a231a
2
32
] (C.15)
Since
δ2
a231
< 1,
=⇒ δ
2
a231a
2
32
<
1
a232
(C.16)
=⇒ 1
a232
− δ
2
a231a
2
32
> 0 (C.17)
=⇒ 1
a231
+
1
a232
− δ
2
a231a
2
32
>
1
a231
(C.18)
=⇒ δ
√
1
a231
+
1
a232
− δ
2
a231a
2
32
> δ
1
a31
(C.19)
=⇒ 1− δ
√
1
a231
+
1
a232
− δ
2
a231a
2
32
< 1− δ 1
a31
(C.20)
=⇒ 1
1− δ2
a231
[1− δ
√
1
a231
+
1
a232
− δ
2
a231a
2
32
] <
1
1− δ2
a231
[1− δ 1
a31
] (C.21)
=⇒ 1
1− δ2
a231
[1− δ
√
1
a231
+
1
a232
− δ
2
a231a
2
32
] <
1
1 + δa31
(C.22)
=⇒ −Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
1
1− δ2
a231
[1− δ
√
1
a231
+
1
a232
− δ
2
a231a
2
32
] > − Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
1
1 + δa31
(C.23)
=⇒ − Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
1
1 + δa31
< R2 (C.24)
=⇒ − Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
< − Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
1
1 + δa31
< R2 (C.25)
Thus, we have proved that
R1 <
−Ma32
σ1
√
ha31
< R2.
Hence R1 will be optimal solution whenever p¯itN−1 ≥ R1, else p¯itN−1 is the optimal solution. It is
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easy to observe that
pitN−1σ1
√
ha31 +Ma32√
pi2tN−1σ
2 +M2
> −a31.
So, there is no admissible trading strategies if δ > a31.
D Proof of lemma 4.1
We need some basic results on variance and covariance of terms involved. Straightforward
computations lead to,
V ar(XtN |FtN−n) = σ21h
N−1∑
i=N−n
pi2ti (D.1)
V ar(BtN |FtN−n) = B2tN−n [(µ˜32 + σ23h)n − µ˜32n] (D.2)
V ar(ItN |FtN−n) =M2
N∑
s=N−n+1
e2kts (D.3)
Cov(XN , BN |FtN−n) = BtN−n µ˜3n−1hσ1σ3a31
N−1∑
i=N−n
pii (D.4)
Cov(IN , BN |FtN−n) = BtN−nMµ˜3n−1
√
hσ3a32
N∑
s=N−n+1
ekts (D.5)
where M = |µ2h+σ2
√
h|−|µ2h−σ2
√
h|
2 . Thus,
correl(XN + IN , BN |FtN−n) =
Cov(XN , BN |FtN−n) + Cov(IN , BN |FtN−n)√
V ar(XtN + ItN |FtN−n)V ar(BtN |FtN−n)
(D.6)
=
b1pitN−n + b2,N−n√
k21,npi
2
tN−n + k
2
2,N−n
(D.7)
b1 = θ3σ1a31
√
h (D.8)
k21,n = [(1 + θ
2
3)
n − 1]σ21h (D.9)
b2,N−n(pi) = θ3[Ma32
N∑
s=N−n+1
ekts + σ1a31
√
h
N−1∑
i=N−n+1
pii] (D.10)
k22,N−n(pi) = [(1 + θ
2
3)
n − 1]{M2
N∑
s=N−n+1
e2kts + σ21h
N−1∑
i=N−n+1
pi2ti}
(D.11)
θ3 =
σ3
√
h
µ˜3
. (D.12)
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E Proof of theorem 4.1
Proof. By Lemma 4.1 it follows that
correl(XN + IN , BN |FtN−n) =
b1pitN−n + b2,N−n√
k21,npi
2
tN−n + k
2
2,N−n
.
Thus, the constraint
correl(XN + IN , BN |FtN−n) =
b1pitN−n + b2,N−n√
k21,npi
2
tN−n + k
2
2,N−n
≤ −δ. (E.1)
⇔ Q(pitN−n) ≥ 0 and pitN−n ≤
−b2,N−n
b1
, (E.2)
where Q(pitN−n) := pi
2
tN−n(b
2
1 − k21,nδ2) + 2b1b2,N−npitN−n + (b22,N−n − δ2k22,N−n). Similar to proof of
Theorem 3.2, we conclude this proof by proving that
−b2,N−n
b1
lies between the roots of quadratic
equation Q(pitN−n) = 0 for all b2,N−n, i.e.
R¯1,N−n ≤ −b2,N−n
b1
≤ R¯2,N−n,
where R¯1,N−n and R¯2,N−n are the roots of the equation Q(pitN−n) = 0, and are given by
R¯1,N−n =
−b1b2,N−n − δk1k2,N−n
√( b2,N−n
k2,N−n
)2
+
(
b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2
b21 − k21,nδ2
(E.3)
R¯2,N−n =
−b1b2,N−n + δk1k2,N−n
√( b2,N−n
k2,N−n
)2
+
(
b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2
b21 − k21,nδ2
. (E.4)
We consider two cases (i) b2,N−n > 0 and (ii) b2,N−n < 0 : separately.
CASE I: b2,N−n > 0 :
R¯1,N−n =
−b1b2,N−n − δk1k2,N−n
√( b2,N−n
k2,N−n
)2
+
(
b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2
b21 − k21,nδ2
(E.5)
≤ −b1b2,N−n
b21 − k21,nδ2
=
−b2,N−n
b1(1− k
2
1,nδ
2
b21
)
≤ −b2,N−n
b1
. (E.6)
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Next we prove that
−b2,N−n
b1
≤ R¯2,N−n. Indeed
R¯2,N−n =
−b1b2,N−n + δk1,nk2,N−n
√( b2,N−n
k2,N−n
)2
+
(
b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2
b21 − k21,nδ2
(E.7)
=
−b2,N−n/b1
(1− k
2
1,nδ
2
b21
)
{
1− k1,nk2,N−nδ
b1b2,N−n
√( b2,N−n
k2,N−n
)2
+
( b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2} (E.8)
=
−b2,N−n/b1
(1− k1,nδb1 )(1 +
k1,nδ
b1
)
{
1− k1,nδ
b1
√
1 +
(k2,N−n
b2,N−n
)2[( b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2]} (E.9)
≥ −b2,N−n/b1
(1 +
k1,nδ
b1
)
≥ −b2,N−n
b1
. (E.10)
So, we proved that
b2,N−n > 0 =⇒ R¯1,N−n ≤ −b2,N−n
b1
≤ R¯2,N−n.
CASE II: b2,N−n < 0 :
For sake of simplicity, we write −b2,N−n = bˆ2,N−n. Thus,
R¯1,N−n =
b1bˆ2,N−n − δk1k2,N−n
√( bˆ2,N−n
k2,N−n
)2
+
(
b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2
b21 − k21,nδ2
(E.11)
=
bˆ2,N−n/b1
(1− k
2
1,nδ
2
b21
)
1− k1,nk2,N−nδb1bˆ2,N−n
√( bˆ2,N−n
k2,N−n
)2
+
( b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2
 (E.12)
=
bˆ2,N−n/b1
(1− k1,nδb1 )(1 +
k1,nδ
b1
)
{
1− k1,nδ
b1
√
1 +
(k2,N−n
bˆ2,N−n
)2[( b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2]} (E.13)
≤ bˆ2,N−n/b1
(1 +
k1,nδ
b1
)
≤ bˆ2,N−n
b1
. (E.14)
Next,
R¯2,N−n =
b1bˆ2,N−n + δk1,nk2,N−n
√( bˆ2,N−n
k2,N−n
)2
+
(
b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2
b21 − k21,nδ2
(E.15)
=
bˆ2,N−n/b1
(1− k
2
1,nδ
2
b21
)
1 + k1,nk2,N−nδb1bˆ2,N−n
√( bˆ2,N−n
k2,N−n
)2
+
( b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2
 (E.16)
=
bˆ2,N−n/b1
(1− k
2
1,nδ
2
b21
)
{
1 +
k1,nδ
b1
√
1 +
(k2,N−n
bˆ2,N−n
)2
[
( b1
k1,n
)2 − δ2]} (E.17)
≥ bˆ2,N−n
b1
(E.18)
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Thus, we proved that for both cases
R¯1,N−n ≤ −b2,N−n
b1
≤ R¯2,N−n.
F Proof of theorem 4.2
Proof. Objective Function: Objective function in 4.10, in light of the deterministic trading
strategies considered, is simplified as follows
maximize
pit0 ,pit1 ,...pitN−1
E[−e−γ(
∑N−1
i=0 pii(µ1h+σ1
√
hsi ))]
=⇒ minimize
pit0 ,pit1 ,...pitN−1
log[e−γ(
∑N−1
i=0 piiµ1h)E[e−γ(
∑N−1
i=0 piiσ1
√
hsi )]]
=⇒ minimize
pit0 ,pit1 ,...pitN−1
− γ(µ1h+ σ1
√
h)
N−1∑
i=0
pii +
N−1∑
i=0
log[(1 + e2γ(piiσ1
√
h))]
(F.1)
Constraints : The constraint on trading strategy is simplified as follows
b1
∑N−1
i=0 pii + b2√
k21
∑N−1
i=0 pi
2
i + k
2
2
≤ −δ
=⇒ b21(
N−1∑
i=0
pii)
2 − δ2k21
N−1∑
i=0
pi2i + 2b2b1
N−1∑
i=0
pii + b
2
2 − k22δ2 ≥ 0 and
N−1∑
i=0
pii ≤ −b2
b1
=⇒ (
N−1∑
i=0
pii)
2 − δ
2k21
b21
N−1∑
i=0
pi2i + 2
b2
b1
N−1∑
i=0
pii +
b22 − k22δ2
b21
≥ 0 and
N−1∑
i=0
pii ≤ −b2
b1
=⇒ (
N−1∑
i=0
pii)
2 − δ
2k21
b21
N−1∑
i=0
pi2i + 2
b2
b1
(
N−1∑
i=0
pii +
b2
b1
)− b
2
2 + k
2
2δ
2
b21
≥ 0 and
N−1∑
i=0
pii ≤ −b2
b1
=⇒ Π′AΠ + 2b2
b1
(1′Π +
b2
b1
) ≥ b
2
2 + k
2
2δ
2
b21
and 1′Π ≤ −b2
b1
=⇒ Π′AΠ + 2c(1′Π + c) ≥ c2 + h2 and (1′Π + c) ≤ 0
(F.2)
where Π′ = [pit0 , pit1 , ...pitN−1 ], c =
b2
b1
, h2 =
k22δ
2
b21
and A is a symmetrix matrix given by,
ai,j =
{
1− δ2k21
b21
, if i = j
1, otherwise
=
{
a, if i = j
1, otherwise
The characteristic equation of A is given by
(λ− (a− 1))n−1(λ− (a+ n− 1)) = 0,
thus A has n−1 negative eigenvalues and one positive eigenvalue. Let us first visualize the solution
in two dimensions, which will then extend to N dimensions.
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Two Dimensions:
In two dimensions, the eigen values are a+1(> 0) and a−1(< 0) and the constraint on the trading
strategies reduces to
a(pi21 + pi
2
2) + 2pi1pi2 + 2c(pi1 + pi2) + c
2 − h2 ≥ 0 and pi1 + pi2 ≤ −c. (F.3)
Since the objective function and the domain is convex, the first order conditions (FOC) lead to
pi1 = pi2.
N-Dimensions:
Since A has N − 1 negative eigen values and one positive eigenvalue, the constraint is a 2-sheeted,
N-dimensional hyperboloid. Moreover, similar to 2 dimensions, the constraint 1′Π ≤ −b2b1 also
passes through the two cones of the hyperboloid, leading to a convex constraint for the domain.
FOC lead to pi1 = ... = pin. Let Π = X + b1, where b =
−c
a+n−1 . This transformation simplifies the
constraints as-
Π′AΠ + 2c(1′Π + c) ≥ c2 + h2
=⇒ (X + b1)′A(X + b1) + 2c(1′(X + b1) + c) ≥ c2 + h2
=⇒ X ′AX + b21′A1 + 2cb1′1 + c2 − h2 ≥ 0
=⇒ X ′AX − nc
2
a+ n− 1 + c
2 − h2 ≥ 0
=⇒ X ′AX − [ c
2(1− a)
a+ n− 1 + h
2] ≥ 0.
(F.4)
Furthermore, the linear constraint gets transformed as -
1′Π + c ≤ 0
=⇒ 1′(X + b1) + c ≤ 0
=⇒ 1′X ≤ −c− nb
=⇒ 1′X ≤ c(1− a)
a+ n− 1 .
(F.5)
Since we have established that the solution exists when, pi1 = ... = pin =⇒ x1 = ... = xn. Thus,
the solution of the deterministic precomittment strategy is
pˆiti = min{p¯i,−b−
√
c2(1− a)
n(a+ n− 1)2 +
h2
n(a+ n− 1)} ∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1} (F.6)
G Proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof. The proof of the result follows from Theorem 3.1 and backward induction.
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